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If a code signer does not yet have a suitable private key for signing the code, the key must first be generated, along with a corresponding public key that can be used by the code receiver's runtime system to verify the signature.

Since this lesson assumes that you don't yet have such keys, you are going to create a keystore named examplestore and create an entry with a newly generated public/private key pair (with the public key in a certificate).

Type the following command in your command window to create a keystore named examplestore and to generate keys:

  • These keys MUST be regenerated per your specific environment. Each key is a JSON Web Token with a defined length per the algorithm used for encryption and signing. In the event that keys are not generated by the deployer, CAS will attempt to auto-generate keys and will output the result for each respected key.
  • The (modulus, exponent) tuple is is the public key. For example, I have a certificate for one of Google's web servers, and if I run openssl x509 -in certfile.pem -text, this is part of the output: That's it. The RSA public key is the modulus and the exponent.
  • Many of the examples on this site generate a random password or session key without enough entropy in the characters or without realistic requirements in a business setting like the ones given above, so I'm asking more pointed question to get a better answer.
  • Before setting up API keys, you must have created an API and deployed it to a stage. For instructions on how to create and deploy an API by using the API Gateway console, see Creating a REST API in Amazon API Gateway and Deploying a REST API in Amazon API Gateway, respectively.
  • The wireless network security key is not correct. Detailed root cause: Layer 2 security key exchange using user-supplied key did not generate unicast keys before timeout Repair option: Verify the network security key for 'bogey1' View the security settings. You can then type the correct security key. Information for connection being diagnosed.

You will be prompted to enter passwords for the key and keystore.

Subparts of the keytool Command

Let's look at what each of the keytool subparts mean.

Two user provided 256-bit strings are processed to generate a 256-bit key that is programmed into the device. A user provided 256-bit key is processed by a one-way function before being programmed into the device. Key Choice: User only set either 1 security key type (non-volatile key or volatile key) into the device.

  • The command for generating keys is -genkey.
  • The -alias signFiles subpart indicates the alias to be used in the future to refer to the keystore entry containing the keys that will be generated.
  • The -keystore examplestore subpart indicates the name (and optionally path) of the keystore you are creating or already using.
  • The storepass value that you are promted for specifies the keystore password.
  • The keypass value that you are prompted for specifies a password for the private key about to be generated. You will always need this password in order to access the keystore entry containing that key. The entry doesn't have to have its own password. When you are prompted for the key password, you are given the option of letting it be the same as the keystore password.

Note: For security reasons you should not set your key or keystore passwords on the command line, because they can be intercepted more easily that way.

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Distinguished-Name Information

If you use the preceding keystore command, you will be prompted for your distinguished-name information. Following are the prompts; the bold indicates what you should type.

Command Results

The keytool command creates the keystore named examplestore (if it doesn't already exist) in the same directory in which the command is executed. The command generates a public/private key pair for the entity whose distinguished name has a common name of Susan Jones and the organizational unit of Purchasing.

The command creates a self-signed certificate that includes the public key and the distinguished-name information. (The distinguished name you supply will be used as the 'subject' field in the certificate.) This certificate will be valid for 90 days, the default validity period if you don't specify a -validity option. The certificate is associated with the private key in a keystore entry referred to by the alias signFiles.

Self-signed certificates are useful for developing and testing an application. However, users are warned that the application is signed with an untrusted certificate and asked if they want to run the application. To provide users with more confidence to run your application, use a certificate issued by a recognized certificate authority.

Note: The command could be shorter if option defaults are accepted or you wish to be prompted for various values. Whenever you execute a keytool command, defaults are used for unspecified options that have default values, and you are prompted for any required values. For the genkey command, options with default values include alias (whose default is mykey), validity (90 days), and keystore (the file named .keystore in your home directory). Required values include dname, storepass, and keypass.

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This article describes the identity attestation process when using symmetric keys with the Device Provisioning Service.

Symmetric key attestation is a simple approach to authenticating a device with a Device Provisioning Service instance. This attestation method represents a 'Hello world' experience for developers who are new to device provisioning, or do not have strict security requirements. Device attestation using a TPM or an X.509 certificate is more secure, and should be used for more stringent security requirements.

Symmetric key enrollments also provide a great way for legacy devices, with limited security functionality, to bootstrap to the cloud via Azure IoT. For more information on symmetric key attestation with legacy devices, see How to use symmetric keys with legacy devices.

Symmetric key creation

By default, the Device Provisioning Service creates new symmetric keys with a default length of 32 bytes when new enrollments are saved with the Auto-generate keys option enabled.

You can also provide your own symmetric keys for enrollments by disabling this option. When specifying your own symmetric keys, your keys must have a key length between 16 bytes and 64 bytes. Also, symmetric keys must be provided in valid Base64 format.

Detailed attestation process

Symmetric key attestation with the Device Provisioning Service is performed using the same Security tokens supported by IoT hubs to identify devices. These security tokens are Shared Access Signature (SAS) tokens.

SAS tokens have a hashed signature that is created using the symmetric key. The signature is recreated by the Device Provisioning Service to verify whether a security token presented during attestation is authentic or not.

SAS tokens have the following form:

SharedAccessSignature sig={signature}&se={expiry}&skn={policyName}&sr={URL-encoded-resourceURI}

Here are the components of each token:

ValueDescription
{signature}An HMAC-SHA256 signature string. For individual enrollments, this signature is produced by using the symmetric key (primary or secondary) to perform the hash. For enrollment groups, a key derived from the enrollment group key is used to perform the hash. The hash is performed on a message of the form: URL-encoded-resourceURI + 'n' + expiry. Important: The key must be decoded from base64 before being used to perform the HMAC-SHA256 computation. Also, the signature result must be URL-encoded.
{resourceURI}URI of the registration endpoint that can be accessed with this token, starting with scope ID for the Device Provisioning Service instance. For example, {Scope ID}/registrations/{Registration ID}
{expiry}UTF8 strings for number of seconds since the epoch 00:00:00 UTC on 1 January 1970.
{URL-encoded-resourceURI}Lower case URL-encoding of the lower case resource URI
{policyName}The name of the shared access policy to which this token refers. The policy name used when provisioning with symmetric key attestation is registration.

When a device is attesting with an individual enrollment, the device uses the symmetric key defined in the individual enrollment entry to create the hashed signature for the SAS token.

For code examples that create a SAS token, see Security Tokens.

Creating security tokens for symmetric key attestation is supported by the Azure IoT C SDK. For an example using the Azure IoT C SDK to attest with an individual enrollment, see Provision a simulated device with symmetric keys.

Group Enrollments

The symmetric keys for group enrollments are not used directly by devices when provisioning. Instead devices that belong to an enrollment group provision using a derived device key.

First, a unique registration ID is defined for each device attesting with an enrollment group. Valid characters for the registration ID are lowercase alphanumeric and dash ('-'). This registration ID should be something unique that identifies the device. For example, a legacy device may not support many security features. The legacy device may only have a MAC address or serial number available to uniquely identify that device. In that case, a registration ID can be composed of the MAC address and serial number similar to the following:

This exact example is used in the How to provision legacy devices using symmetric keys article.

Once a registration ID has been defined for the device, the symmetric key for the enrollment group is used to compute an HMAC-SHA256 hash of the registration ID to produce a derived device key. The hashing of the registration ID can be performed with the following C# code:

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The resulting device key is then used to generate a SAS token to be used for attestation. Each device in an enrollment group is required to attest using a security token generated from a unique derived key. The enrollment group symmetric key cannot be used directly for attestation.

Installation of the derived device key

Ideally the device keys are derived and installed in the factory. This method guarantees the group key is never included in any software deployed to the device. When the device is assigned a MAC address or serial number, the key can be derived and injected into the device however the manufacturer chooses to store it.

Generate

Consider the following diagram that shows a table of device keys generated in a factory by hashing each device registration ID with the group enrollment key (K).

The identity of each device is represented by the registration ID and derived device key that is installed at the factory. The device key is never copied to another location and the group key is never stored on a device.

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If the device keys are not installed in the factory, a hardware security module HSM should be used to securely store the device identity.

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Next steps

The Security Key Must Be Auto Generated In One Of The Machines

Now that you have an understanding of Symmetric Key attestation, check out the following articles to learn more: